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TORTS-DEFAMATION-NEW JERSEY SHIELD LAW PROVIDES NEWSPERSONS
AN

ABSOLUTE

PRIVILEGE PROTECTING EDITORIAL

CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

FROM DISCOVERY

PROCESSES AND
IN A

DEFAMATION ACTION.

Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly (N.J. 1982)
An article in the October, 1979 issue of New Jersey-Monthly magazine entitled Rating the Legislature placed State Senator Joseph Maressa
in "The Worst" category, describing him as "floundering and ineffectual." 1 The article based Senator Maressa's low rating on several incidents, concluding that "Maressa's problem is not so much that he is evil
as that he is sneaky, self-interested, and basically unprincipled." 2
On December 12, 1979, Senator Maressa, a public figure,3 brought
4
suit, alleging that the article falsely conveyed to the public the idea
that he was "unfit to serve the people of New Jersey," 5 and that the
defendants had published defamatory statements without reasonably
inquiring as to their accuracy, thereby defaming him in reckless disregard of the truth. 0 In response to Senator Maressa's requests for pretrial discovery,7 the defendants refused to provide any information about
1. Carpenter, Fisher & Narus, Rating the Legislature, N.J. MONTHLY,
Oct. 1979, at 53, 56-57. The article categorized New Jersey's legislators as
"The Best," "The Worst," and "The Drones." Id. at 53.
2. Id. at 56-57. The article alleged that Senator Maressa whined and
attempted to cut off a Senate debate of the death penalty; that he smuggled an
anti-gay lobbyist onto the Senate floor and lied to the Sargeant-at-Arms, claiming that the lobbyist was his aide; that he was called before the Legislative
Ethics Committee; and that he was "shot down" by the Supreme Court Advisory Committee. Id. at 57.
3. Maressa acknowledged that he was a public figure and as such was
required to prove reckless or willful disregard of the truth in order to recover
damages for libel. Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 183 n.1, 445
A.2d 376, 379 n.1, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 211 (1982) (citing New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a discussion of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, see notes 19-21 and accompanying text infra.
4. 89 N.J. at 183, 445 A.2d at 379, ce~t. denied, 103 S. Ct. 211 (1982).
Senator Maressa filed a libel action in the New Jersey Superior Court Law
Division against the magazine's owner, the publisher, the editor-in-chief, an
editor, and the three reporters who wrote the article. Id.
5. Id. at 182-83, 445 A.2d at 379. Senator Maressa also alleged that the
article falsely conveyed the idea that he had participated in dishonest, illegal,
and unethical practices. Id.
6. Id.

7. Id. at 183, 445 A.2d at 379. Maressa, through interrogatories and
depositions, sought a broad range of information including the names and
addresses of all sources interviewed, copies of all notes and memos pertaining
to the article, and a summary of statements made by all sources. Id. at 183,
445 A.2d at 380.
(225)
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their sources or editorial processes, asserting a newsperson's privilege.

Senator Maressa's motion to compel discovery, was granted by the trial
court 'which ruled that the information sought was not privileged and

alternatively held that any newsperson's privilege had been waived.0
The defendants were ordered by the trial court to provide specific

answers or face judicial sanctions.' 0
The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division granted the
defendants leave to appeal the interlocutory order compelling disclosure;

however, before that court heard the appeal, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey certified the case on its own motion 11 and reversed the trial
court,12 holding that in a civil action for defamation the New Jersey
Shield Law affords newspersons an absolute privilege not to disclose
confidential sources and editorial processes. Maressa v. New Jersey
Monthly, 89 N.J. 176, 445 A.2d 376, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 211 (1982).
The law of defamation embodies the tension between an individ-

ual's interest in his reputation and society's interest in free speech and a
free press, as guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States
8. Id. The defendants answered each interrogatory with the word "privileged." Id. For a discussion of testimonial and evidentiary privileges, see
note 23 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the development
of newsperson's privileges, see notes 2247 and accompanying text infra.
. 9. 89 N.J. at 183, 445 A.2d at 380. Maressa sought an order compelling
more specific answers to his interrogatories and deposition questions. Id.
See N.J. CT. R. 4:23-1(a) (West Supp. 1982) (provision for court order compelling discovery upon failure to answer). The trial court ruled that the
defendants had waived their privilege by disclosing that the article was based
on interviews with about 50 lobbyists, administrative officials, legislative liaisons,
committee aides, and Trenton journalists. 89 N.J. at 194, 445 A.2d at 386.
After the trial court's order to compel discovery, Maressa served another set
of interrogatories on the defendants, which again went unanswered under the
claim of newsperson's privilege. Id. at 183, 445 A.2d at 380. For the full text
of the current New Jersey Shield Law, which grants a newsperson's privilege
and specifies the conditions under which this privilege may be waived, see
notes 53 &c59 infra.
10. 89 N.J. at 183, 445 A.2d at 380.
11. Id. See N.J. CT. R. 2:2-4 (West Supp. 1982) (provision for appeal of
interlocutory order). See also N.J. CT. R. 2:12-1, 2:12-4 (West Supp. 1982)
(provisions for discretionary certification to the New Jersey Supreme Court on
its own motion on questions of general importance).
12. 89 N.J. at 183, 445 A.2d at 380 (1982). In a companion case to
Maressa, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the New Jersey Shield Law
established an absolute newsperson's privilege to not disclose notes, memoranda, rough drafts, editorial comments, sources, and other information sought
by the plaintiff in a defamation action against the defendant magazine.
Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. NJM Assocs., 89 N.J. 212, 215, 445 A.2d 395, 397 (1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 212 (1982). The court concluded that the defendants'
compliance with the trial court's orders to provide additional information,
including the names of about 20 sources who had not requested confidentiality,
did not constitute a waiver of the protection of the New Jersey Shield Law.
Id. at 215-16, 445 A.2d at 397.
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Constitution. 13 An individual's reputation is protected from the publication of injurious falsehoods by the common law actions for libel or
slander.' 4 Under New Jersey law, the injured plaintiff must prove, inter
alia, that the publication of the alleged defamatory statement tends to
diminish his esteem, good will, or confidence in the public eye or tends
to incite adverse or derogatory feelings about him. 15 The first amend13. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides "Congress shall
make no law . . .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id. The

New Jersey Constitution is more explicit:
Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law
shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the
press. In all prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be

given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that
the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.
N.J. CONST. art. 1, § 6. For the role played by a defamation action in safeguarding a plaintiff's reputation, see note 14 infra.
14.

See W.

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS

§§ 111-115,

at

737-

802 (4th ed. 1971). A libel action lies when the defamatory statement is
written. Id. at 737. The allegedly false statement must be communicated, or
"published," to a third person for defamation to be actionable. Id. See also

Rainer's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 557, 117 A.2d
889, 891 (1955). That decision recognized that the common law action of defamation "embodies the important public policy that individuals and business
entities should generally be free to enjoy their reputations unimpaired by
false and defamatory attacks." Id. See also Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22

N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956).

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that there is no federal
constitutional right to bring a defamation action and that the right to sue for
defamation emanates only from state tort law. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 712 (1976). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has also held that there is no federal constitutional right to bring a defamation
action. See Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1980).
For a detailed discussion of this case, see Note, Torts-Defamation-Public
Figure Rule Applies to Sellers Who Use Extensive Advertising to Solicit the
Public's Attention and Seek to Influence Consumer Choice, 26 VILL. L. REv.
914 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Steaks Unlimited].
15. The law of defamation in New Jersey imposes broad liability for the
publication of false statements that tend to injure the reputation of others.
Rainer's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 557, 117 A.2d 889,
891 (1955). Criticism may be captious, ill-founded, and unjust, but it is not
libelous unless it exposes the object thereof to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or
disgrace or subjects him to the loss of good will and the confidence of the
community. Mosler v. Whelan, 28 N.J. 397, 399-400, 147 A.2d 7, 14-15 (1959).
The law of defamation requires proof of a "publication," a communication to
a third person, of the allegedly defamatory material. Gnapinsky v. Goldyn,
23 N.J. 243, 252, 128 A.2d 697, 702 (1957). To meet constitutional standards,
a public official plaintiff who brings an action for defamation has the burden
of proving that the publication of the allegedly defamatory statement was
made with actual malice. Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 510 F. Supp.
761, 763 (D.N.J. 1981). To comply with the actual malice standard, the
public official must prove that the statement was published with knowledge of
its falsity or with serious doubt as to the truth of the publication. Id. "Actual
malice" can only arise from a false statement of fact, since mere opinions'are
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ment freedoms, on the other hand, are protected by judicial and legislative limitations on the cause of action for defamation. 16 When the
suit is brought against the news media, these limitations take predominantly two forms, the "actual malice" standard for public figures and
officials,' 7 and the newsperson's testimonial or evidentiary privilege.' 8
privileged and not redressable in defamation actions in New Jersey. Kotlikoff
v, Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 68-69, 444 A.2d 1086, 1089 (1982). For a

further discussion of the "actual malice standard," see note 21 and accompanying text infra.
16. See W. PROSSER, supra note 14, § 114, at 776-85. The courts have
developed an absolute testimonial privilege in defamation suits which renders
certain persons acting in their official capacity-such as judges in judicial proceedings, legislators in legislative proceedings, the President, Cabinet, superior
officers of executive department, and some state officials acting in their executive capacity-immune from liability for defamation. See id. at 776-85.
Prosser also states that an absolute privilege can shield a defendant from a
defamation action if the injured plaintiff "consented" to the defamation by
inviting or instigating it. Id. at 784.
The courts have also developed a "qualified privilege" which conditions
immunity from liability for defamation on the manner in which the statement
is published and the purpose for which it is published. Id. § 115, at 785-86.
A qualified privilege has been found where defamatory statements are made
by a person for the protection of his own reputation, for the protection of the
interest of others, for the protection of the common interests of the publisher
and recipient of the statement, or for the protection of some interest of the
public. Id. at 786-92. Prosser states that the qualified privilege is extinguished
if the defendant's conduct is outside the scope of the privilege with respect to
either subject matter or state of mind. Id. at 792.
For a discussion of the state of mind needed to prove defamation against
public figures, see notes 19-21 and accompanying text infra. For examples of a
qualified privilege precluding liability for defamation in New Jersey, see
Reilly v. Gillen, 176 N.J. Super. 321, 423 A.2d 311 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980)
(reports of a judicial proceeding are privileged); Sinderband v. Schuster, 170
N.J. Super. 506, 406 A.2d 1344 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (statements by state
officials are privileged if made within the scope of their employment); State
v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 251 A.2d 442 (1969) (qualified testimonial privilege between husband and wife).
Opinions, as contrasted with statements of fact, are also considered to be
privileged statements under the common law privilege of "fair comment."
Kotlikoff v. Community News, 89 N.J. 62, 68-69, 444 A.2d 1086, 1089 (1982).
The "fair comment" privilege in most states extends to opinions published
to the general public on matters of public concern, such as the conduct or
qualifications of public officers and employees. W. PROSSER, supra note 14,
§ 118, at 819. Prosser states that the common law privilege of fair comment
has been subsumed within the New York Times "actual malice" standard
although some state courts still speak of it as a separate privilege. Id. See
also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (opinions are
privileged from defamation actions). In the New York Times case, the
Supreme Court conferred a qualified constitutional privilege on the news
media which was not limited to comment or opinion and which extended to
false statements of fact, provided that they were made without "actual
malice." Id. at 820. For a discussion of New York Times, see notes 19-21 infra.
17. For a discussion of the actual malice standard, see notes 19-21 and
accompanying text infra.
18. For a discussion of the development of a reporter's qualified constitutional privilege from liability for defamation, see notes 22-42 and accompany-
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The judicial evolution of the first of these limitations on defamation
actions began in 1964 with the landmark decision of New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan.19 That case and subsequent decisions afforded newspersons protection from defamation actions under the first amendment
by holding that public officials and other public figures -0 have the
burden of proving that the allegedly false and defamatory statement
was published with "actual malice," that is, with knowledge of its falsity
ing text infra. For an overview of the development of a reporter's qualified
statutory privilege conferred by state shield laws, see notes 43-47 and accompanying text infra. For an outline of the statutory reporter's privilege in
New Jersey and its various judicial interpretations, see notes 48-62 and accompanying text infra.
Privileges may be either testimonial or evidentiary. See C. McCORMICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 72, at 151 (2d ed. 1972). The purpose
of a testimonial privilege "is the protection of interests and relationships which,
rightly or wrongly, are regarded as of sufficient social importance to justify
some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the administration of
justice." Id. at 152. Traditional evidentiary privileges, or rules of exclusion,
as they are sometimes called, facilitate "the ascertainment of facts by guarding
against evidence which is unreliable or is calculated to prejudice or mislead."
Id. McCormick notes that although statutory evidentiary privileges were
often seen by legal commentators and scholars as suppressing the truth rather
than uncovering it, these privileges, which protect confidential communications
from disclosure, implicate rights of privacy and security too important to relinquish for the convenience of litigants. Id. § 77, at 157.
19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This case involved a suit by the Alabama Commissioner of Public Affairs against the New York Times Co. and four private
citizens who had allegedly libelled him in a paid advertisement in the New
York Times. Id. at 256. The advertisement described police abuse of students
protesting in support of the Negro student movement at Alabama State College.
Id. at 256-57. For a complete discussion of the New York Times decision, see
Note, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech and Association, 78 HARv. L.
REV. 201 (1964); Note, Constitutional Law, First Amendment Requires Qualified Privilege to Publish Defamatory Misstatements About Public Officials, 113
U. PA. L. REV. 284 (1964); Note, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan-The Scope
of a Privilege, 51 VA. L. REV. 106 (1965).
20. 376 U.S. at 279-80. New York Times applied the "actual malice" test
to public officials. Id. Later, the "actual malice" standard was extended by
the Supreme Court to encompass defamation suits brought by "public figures."
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). The Court reasoned
that, like public officials, public figures command "sufficient continuing public
interest and have sufficient access to the means of counterargument" with which
to defend themselves against defamatory statements. Id. (quoting Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). A plurality of
the Supreme Court in 1971 extended the actual malice standard to apply in
suits brought by private individuals where the allegedly defamatory statements
involved a matter of general or public concern. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 56-58 (1971). The Court in 1974, however, retreated from
this position and returned to the private/public figure distinction. Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974). The Gertz Court reasoned
that an extension of the New York Times standard of actual malice to private
individuals in cases involving matters of public concern abridged a legitimate
state interest in providing remedies to private persons who have been injured
by defamatory statements. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that public
figures voluntarily expose themselves to public scrutiny, thereby increasing the
risk of publication of defamatory statements about them. Id. at 345. Therefore, the Court stated it was not unfair to subject public figures to the more
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or in reckless disregard of its falsity.2 '
In contrast to the requirement that a plaintiff prove some fault on
the part of the newsperson, the news media may also be protected by
statutory or constitutional privileges. The notion that the first amendment required the creation of a newsperson's privilege first arose in
Branzburg v. Hayes.22 In Branzburg, the United States Supreme Court

refused to grant newspersons a testimonial privilege

23

under the first

rigorous "actual malice" burden of proof in establishing defamation. Id. The
Court further held that, since private individuals do not voluntarily relinquish
any interest in preserving their reputations, they should not be subjected to
the burden of the "actual malice" standard, Id. at 345. Cf. Lawrence v.
Bauer, 89 N.J. 451, 446 A.2d 469 (1982) (private individuals who were also
officers of grassroots taxpayers association were deemed "public figures" by the
New Jersey Supreme Court for purposes of defamation suit against newspaper
and subjected to the actual malice standard).
21. 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court reasoned that a society which supports
free debate must bear the burden of enduring inevitable erroneous statements
in order to preserve the freedom of expression. Id. at 271-72. The Court
subsequently defined "reckless disregard of falsity" as existing where the defendant newsperson "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication" and held that a mere failure to investigate what a prudent editor
would question does not constitute actual malice. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390
U.S. 727, 731 (1968). Evidence of ill will or intent to injure without anything
else has also been held to be insufficient to allow recovery. See Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966).
Prior to New York Times, libelous utterances were not considered to be
within the area of constitutionally protected speech. Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). The accepted view was that the imposition of liability for a defamatory publication violated neither freedom of speech nor
freedom of the press and a majority of jurisdictions made publishers liable
regardless of intent. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 158-59 (1979) (citing
Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909)).
22. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In Branzburg, separate grand juries subpoenaed
three reporters seeking testimony that would involve disclosure of unnamed
sources who had provided the reporters with information concerning alleged
criminal activity. Id. at 667-79. Two of the reporters argued that they could
not disclose the identities of their sources because they had promised confidentiality to the sources. Id. at 668 n.l, 672. The third argued for a qualified
testimonial privilege to protect the confidentiality of his source. Id. at 679.
For further information on Branzburg, see Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and
the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975).
23. 408 U.S. at 667. The Court held that the first amendment did not
give rise to any testimonial privilege, qualified or absolute, that would protect
a newsperson's agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his news sources
or incriminating evidence against them. Id. at 692. Justice White's plurality
opinion noted that "[a]t common law, courts consistently refused to recognize
the existence of any privilege authorizing a newsman to refuse to reveal confidential information to a grand jury." Id. at 685. For a discussion of the
cases denying a common law reporter's privilege, see Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 591
(1966). For a discussion of the position that the press "deserves" a testimonial
privilege due to its special role as "watchdog" in American democracy, see
Address by Justice Stewart, Yale Law School Sesquicentennial Convocation
(Nov. 2, 1974), reprinted in Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631
(1975). Address by Justice Pashman, New Jersey Press Association, Sea View
Country Club, Absecon (1979), reprinted in 104 N.J.L.J. 529 (Dec. 20, 1979).
But see Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journalism, 19 PUB. ENT. ADVER. 8:
ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 55 (1980) (arguing against Stewart's "preferred position"
for the press theory).
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amendment that would shield them from being required to disclose the

identities of their confidential sources to a grand jury in a criminal investigation. 24 Justice White's majority opinion 25 and Justice Powell's
concurrence 26 noted that the public interest in law enforcement and in
ensuring effective grand jury proceedings outweighed the interest in
protecting the confidentiality of news sources.2 7 The majority discounted
24. Id. at 690-91. The majority of the Court held that reporters have the
same obligation as any other citizen to respond to grand jury subpoenas and
to answer questions relevant to investigations into criminal activity. Id. Justice
White's failure to discuss whether subpoenas by bodies other than a grand jury
would be covered by Branzburg suggested to one commentator that such subpoenas present a different issue. See Note, The Newsman's Privilege After
Branzburg: The Case for a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 160, 17273 n.70 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Case for a Federal Shield Law].
Justice White, however, did imply that the Branzburg holding would apply
in the context of an ordinary criminal trial. 408 U.S. at 690-91. Branzburg
has been generally interpreted to cover those situations in which newspersons
are subpoenaed for either grand jury proceedings or criminal trials. See Comment, The Fallacy of Farber: Failure to Acknowledge the Constitutional Newsman's Privilege in Criminal Cases, 70 J. CRIM. LAw & CRIMINOLOGY 299, 320
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Fallacy of Farber].
25. 408 U.S. at 665. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell,
and Rehn 9 uist joined with Justice White. Id. Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Marshall and Brennan, joined. Id. at 725.
Justice Douglas also filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 711.
26. 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell joined in the
Court's decision and wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize that he believed
the majority opinion to be limited; he stressed that the majority did not hold
that newspersons subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their
sources. Id. Rather he proposed a qualified newsreporter's privilege in which
[t]he asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the
striking of a proper balance between the freedom of the press and the
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to
criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and
societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and
traditional way of adjudicating such questions.
Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 690. Justice White rejected the ad hoc balancing approach
proposed by Justice Powell. He stated that "[w]e are unwilling to embark
the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to such an uncertain destination.
The administration of a constitutional newsman's privilege would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a higher order." Id. at 703-04. For a discussion of Justice Powell's balancing approach, see note 26 supra. Justice
White viewed the balancing of the public's interest in enforcing the criminal
law against the need for a confidential news relationship as a legislative, not a
judicial function. 408 U.S. at 705-06. Despite these protestations, Justice
White used an analysis in Branzburg that seemed to balance the public interest
in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings against the "consequential but
uncertain" burden on newsgathering that allegedly results from insisting that
reporters respond to questions asked of them in grand jury investigations. Id.
at 690-91. As a result, Branzburg has been commonly accepted as authority
for a case-by-case balancing of competing interests. See Note, Source Protection in Libel Suits After Herbert v. Lando, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 338, 352
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Source Protection].
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as "largely speculative" the purported chilling effect 28 that compelling
a newsperson to testify at a grand jury proceeding would have on the
newsperson's ability to report the news and on his ability to preserve.
confidential sources. 29 Although the Branzburg Court recognized that
the newsgathering process deserved "some protection" from outside inquiry, it did not define the appropriate scope of protection. 30
28. 408 U.S. at 693-94. Justice White stated that "[e]stimates of the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on the willingness of informants to make disclosures to newsmen are widely divergent and to a great extent speculative."
Id. He continued, stating that "[s]urveys of reporters on this topic are chiefly
opinions of predicted informant behavior and must be viewed in the light of

the professional self-interest of the interviewees [sic]."

Id. at 694.

Justice

Stewart in dissent argued that "[t]he impairment of the flow of news cannot,
of course, be proved with scientific precision, as the Court seems to demand.
. . . But we have never before demanded that First Amendment rights rest
on elaborate empirical studies demonstrating beyond any conceivable doubt
that deterrent effects exist .... ." Id. at 733 (Stewart, J., dissenting). For a
statistical survey of newspersons' views on the purported "chilling effect" of
press subpoenas on news reporting and on the concept of a first amendment
testimonial privilege, see Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study,
70 MICH. L. REV. 229, 264-69 (1971). For a further discussion of the "chilling
effect," see Comment, Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 AM.
B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 797 (1981) [hereinafter cited Comment, Suing Media];
Comment, The Chilling Effect in Press Cases: Judicial Thumb on Scales, 15
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 685, 711 (1980); Note, Case for a Federal Shield Law,
supra note 33, at 173-76; Note, The Editorial Function and the Gertz Public
Figure Standard, 87 YALE L.J. 1723, 1738, 1742 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Note, The Editorial Function].
29. 408 U.S. at 693-94. Justice White denied that compelling a newsperson to testify in a grand jury proceeding would destroy his relationship
with his confidential sources. Id. at 694-95. He stated that the relationship
of many informants to the press is a "symbiotic one which is unlikely to be
greatly inhibited by the threat of subpoena; quite often, such informants are
members of a minority political or cultural group that relies heavily on the
media to propagate its views, publicize its aims, and magnify its exposure to
the public." Id. For a contrary view concluding that subpoenas may interfere
with the quality of source relationships and may even cause the "drying up"
of confidential sources, see Blasi, supra note 28, at 264-69. Blasi states that
press subpoenas are sometimes used as a conscious device to drive a wedge
between reporters and their radical sources. Id. at 662.
30. 408 U.S. at 681. Justice White's majority opinion recognized that
"without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could
be eviscerated." Id, For subsequent cases finding various degrees of a newsperson's privilege, see notes 36-42 and accompanying text infra. A number of
commentators have argued for a qualified testimonial privilege for newspersons
providing for a bifurcated trial in which a plaintiff in a civil defamation suit
must prove the prima facie falsity of the alleged defamatory statement in a
threshold hearing in order to compel discovery of a newsperson's materials.
See, e.g., Franklin, Reflections on Herbert v. Lando, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1035
(1979); Hunter, EditorialPrivilege and the Scope of Discovery in Sullivan Rule
Libel Actions, 67 Ky. L.J. 789 (1978-79); Note, Source Protection, supra note
27, at 362-63; Note, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 719 (1980); Note, The Supreme Court, 1978
Term, 93 HARv. L. REV. 60, 150-61 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, 197s8
Term]. Other commentators have endorsed an absolute evidentiary privilege
for newspersons in civil defamation suits. See, e.g., Note, Herbert v. Lando:
State of Mind Discovery and the New York Times v. Sullivan Libel Balance,
66 CALIF. L. REV. 1127 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, State of Mind Dis-
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Presented with another opportunity to fashion a newsperson's
privilege, the United States Supreme Court, in Herbert v. Lando,31 a
defamation action, again declined to do so.8 2 The Court determined,
instead, that access in discovery to information that would reveal a reporter's state of mind,83 conduct, and materials used during the newscovery]; Note, Defamation and the First Amendment: Editorial Process Found
"Privileged" in Herbert v. Lando, 13 TULSA L.J. 837 (1978). A few commentators support liberal pretrial discovery of a newsperson's materials in a
defamation action. See, e.g., Bezanson, Herbert v. Lando. Editorial Judgment
and Freedom of the Press: An Essay, 3 S. ILL. U.L. FORUM 605 (1978); Note,
31 VAND. L. REV. 375 (1978). For a discussion of the differences between
absolute and qualified privileges for the media, see note 36 infra.
31. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). Justice White wrote the opinion for the majority,
which included Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist,
and Stevens. Id. at 155.
In Herbert, Barry Lando produced a segment for the CBS program, "60
Minutes," consisting of a series of interviews with Army Colonel Anthony
Herbert, who spoke about atrocities in Vietnam. Id. at 156. The program
cast doubt on Herbert's allegations, implying that Herbert was prompted to
make the charges because he had been relieved of his command when he went
public with the allegations. Id. Lando also wrote an article in Atlantic
Monthly recounting the affair and again casting doubt on Herbert's veracity.
Id. Herbert sued Lando, Mike Wallace, CBS, and Atlantic Monthly, claiming
substantial damages for defamation and impairment of literary property (he
had written a book on this topic). Id. For a further discussion of the Herbert
facts and opinion, see Franklin, supra note 30; Hunter, supra note 30; Note,
State of Mind Discovery, supra note 30; Note, 18 DUQ. L. REv. 719 (1980); Note,
Herbert v. Lando: Editorial Process Denied a Discovery Privilege, 7 Oi-o
N.U.L. REV. 129 (1980); Note, 1978 Term, supra note 30; Note, Herbert v.
Lando: The Supreme Court's Infidelity to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
13 U.C.D. L. REV. 374 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Infidelity to New
York Times]; Note, Freedom of the Press: Herbert v. Lando, Journalist's
Editorial Immunity, 47 UMKC L. REv. 273 (1978).
32. 441 U.S. at 160. The Herbert majority stated that a newsperson's
privilege protecting the editorial process would "constitute a substantial interference with the ability of a defamation plaintiff to establish the ingredients
of malice as required by New York Times." Id. The Court reasoned that
[t]o erect an impenetrable barrier to the plaintiff's use of such
evidence on his side of the case is a matter of some substance, particularly when the defendants themselves are prone to assert their
good-faith belief in the truth of their publications, and libel plaintiffs
are required to prove knowing or reckless falsehood with 'convincing
clarity.'
Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86). The
Herbert majority, therefore, refused to create a constitutional privilege for
the editorial process which would exclude a range of direct evidence relevant
to proving "actual malice" needed by the plaintiff. 441 U.S. at 169. Justice
White argued for the majority that a more accurate report of the creation and
publication of alleged defamatory material would be obtained through both
direct and indirect evidence of "actual malice." Id. at 172-73.
33. Id. at 160. Justice White noted that it was "untenable" to conclude
that, since the necessary state of mind for actual malice could be inferred from
an analysis of the indirect objective circumstances surrounding the alleged
defamatory publication, plaintiffs should be prevented from asking the defendants whether they knew or had reason to know that their damaging pub-
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gathering and editorial process 84 was essential to a public figure plaintiff
attempting to comply with the stringent New York Times "actual
malice" standard.3 5
lication was in error. Id. In support of allowing discovery as to a newsperson's state of mind, Justice White stated:
Courts have traditionally admitted any direct or indirect evidence
relevant to the state of mind of the defendant and necessary to defeat
a conditional privilege or enhance damages. The rules are applicable
to the press and to other defendants alike, and it is evident that the
courts across the country have long been accepting evidence going to
the editorial processes of the media without encountering constitutional objections.
Id. at 165.
One commentator has suggested that state of mind discovery is of dubious
importance to plaintiffs because they have free access to evidence of a defendant's objective behavior, from which a jury could infer a state of mind,
and that defendants are unlikely to reveal anything suggesting that they
published with doubts about the truth of their stories. See Note, State of
Mind Discovery, supra note 30, at 1144. See also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (defendant's state of mind "does not readily lend
itself to summary judgments"). For cases holding that actual malice can be
found by using indirect evidence, see, e.g., Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d
324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970) (careless investigatory
techniques and statistically invalid poll combined with apparently defamatory
plan inferred from defendant's letters constituted actual malice); Bindrim v.
Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 984 (1979) (disparity between defendant's published account of therapy
sessions and plaintiff's tape recording of same sessions constituted evidence of
actual malice); Akins v. Altus Newspapers, Inc., 3 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1449
(Okla. 1977) (reporter's failure to personally contact any of the parties involved
in an alleged police kidnapping supported a finding of reckless disregard);
Hodges v. Oklahoma Journal Publishing Co., 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2492
(Okla. Ct. App. 1979) (repeated use of provocative headlines unsupported by
facts in accompanying articles support inference of actual malice); Stevens v.
Sun Publishing Co., 270 S.C. 65, 240 S.E.2d 812, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 945
(1978) (failure to follow leads and contact available sources was evidence of
reckless disregard). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, comment g. The Restatement suggests that the media should be judged primarily
by the indirect evidence of professional custom as adduced by expert testimony
and that the relevant factors to consider are deadline pressures, the nature of
the interests the defendant was seeking to further, and the degree of damage
to the reputation or sensibilities of the plaintiff. Id.
34. 441 U.S. at 175. A commentator has noted that a weakness in the
majority's opinion lay in its failure to define "editorial process." See Note,
1978 Term, supra note 30, at 154. The editorial process has been described
by one commentator as the "process by which the press selects certain facts from
all available information and packages them for dissemination to the public
. . . includ[ing a] determination of which selected information will be presented and which will be 'buried' within a publication, a page, or an article."
Note, The Editorial Function, supra note 28, at 1735.
35. 441 U.S. at 175. The majority opinion, however, admitted that editorial discussions and exchanges have some constitutional protection from
"casual inquiry." Id. at 174. Justice White opined "[t]here is no law that
subjects the editorial process to private or official examination merely to satisfy
curiosity or to serve some general end such as public interest; and if there
were, it would not survive constitutional scrutiny as the first amendment is'
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Despite the Supreme Court's holdings in Branzburg and Herbert,
several federal appellate and district courts have acknowledged qualified,
but not absolute, privileges 36 protecting from discovery the identities of
a newsperson's sources, 87 the materials used,38 and the conduct of a
newsperson during the newsgathering and editorial process. 39 Some
presently construed." Id. Although the Court noted that two earlier Supreme
Court decisions had protected an editor's right to select and package the
material to be disseminated, it stressed that editorial freedom is not absolute
and must yield to disclosure in this case. Id. at 167 (citing Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state "right of reply" statute
giving any political candidate whose character had been assailed the right to
free space in newspapers invalidated as improper usurpation of editorial control and judgment by the state); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (network policy of refusing all editorial
advertisements deemed not a violation of advertisers' first amendment rights
and a proper exercise of editorial control)). For a discussion of these cases,
see Comment, Herbert v. Lando: Reporter's Privilege from Revealing the
Editorial Process in a Defamation Suit, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 448, 454-55 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Reporter's Privilege]. Justice White's majority
opinion reasoned that
New York Times and its progeny made it essential to proving liability
that the plaintiff focus on the conduct and state of mind of the
defendant. To be liable, the alleged defamer of public officials or of
public figures must know or have reason to suspect that his publication is false. In other cases proof of some kind of fault, negligence
perhaps, is essential to recovery. Inevitably, unless liability is to be
completely foreclosed, the thoughts and editorial processes of the
alleged defamer would be open to examination.
Id.
36. A privilege may be either absolute or qualified. If it is characterized
as absolute, no disclosure can be compelled under any circumstances. Comment, Reporter's Privilege, supra note 35, at 453 n.28. In contrast, a qualified
or conditional privilege "exists only when the need for protection is not
clearly outweighed by the need for disclosure." See Friedenthal, Herbert v.
Lando: A Note on Discovery, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1065 (1979).
Both Justice Powell and Justice Brennan advocated a qualified reporter's
privilege in Herbert v. Lando. See 441 U.S. at 179-80 (Powell, J., concurring);
id. at 196-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting). One commentator has labelled Justice
Brennan's special form of a qualified reporter's privilege a "threshold privilege," which is extinguished once the plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie
case of falsity. Franklin, supra note 30, at 1065. For a further discussion of
a qualified privilege, see notes 37-42 and 120-23 infra.
37. See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno &
Stillman v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980); Miller v.
Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980); Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); Baker v. F. & F. Inv., 470 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
38. See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 35 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Los
Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 89 F.R.D.
489 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building & Constr. Trades
Council, 443 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord,
356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 93 F.R.D. 35 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
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courts have arrived at this position by analyzing state common law; 40
other courts have found a qualified privilege by utilizing the threepronged discovery test of "relevance, necessity, and the nonexistence of
an alternative source" articulated in Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg; 41 still others have applied the "heart of the claim" test first
42
developed by the Second Circuit.

A broader and more encompassing form of newsperson's privilege
has been bestowed by state legislatures, which have statutorily mandated
testimonial and evidentiary privileges protecting journalists from being
required to disclose certain information in response to subpoenas and
40. See Federal Rule of Evidence 501 which directs that, unless otherwise

preempted by federal constitutional or statutory law, "privilege" is to be
governed by principles of common law as interpreted by the various states.
FED. R. Evw. 501.

For federal cases applying state common law through Federal Rule of

Evidence 501, see, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 945 (1981), on remand, 511 F. Supp. 375 (D.N.J.),
rev'd, 651 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1981) (rule 501 extended to encompass the compelled production of a reporter's resource materials); Miller v. Transamerican
Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980) (availability of a journalist's privilege
in a diversity action is governed by the law of the forum state); Riley v. City
of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979) (legislative history of rule 501 revealed
that the rule was designed to encompass a reporter's privilege not to disclose a
source although the original draft did not include such a privilege).
41. See 408 U.S. 665, 739-43 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart urged
recognition of a qualified privilege for newspersons which would place the
initial burden of proof on the government to demonstrate why the newsperson
should not be permitted to invoke that protection. Id. at 743. Justice Stewart
said that the government would meet the burden if it could
(1)show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has
information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of
the law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First Amendment rights;
and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the information.
Id. (footnotes omitted). For cases employing this three-pronged test, see, e.g.,
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (qualified privilege upheld);
Baker v. F. & F. Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966
(1973) (qualified privilege upheld); United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (qualified privilege not upheld); DeRoburt v. Gannet Co., 507 F.
Supp. 880 (D. Hawaii 1981) (qualified privilege upheld); Democratic Nat'l
Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973) (qualified privilege upheld).
42. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
910 (1958). The Garland opinion, authored by then-Circuit Judge Potter
Stewart, upheld a criminal contempt order against a reporter who refused to
answer questions about the identity of her confidential source. Id. at 550.
Judge Stewart noted that the identity of the source "went to the heart of the
plaintiff's claim," that the plaintiff had explored alternative means of determining the source's identity, and that the claim was not "patently frivolous."
Id. at 550-51. For opinions applying this test, see, e.g., Bruno 8 Stillman v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1980) (qualified privilege upheld);
Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980) (qualified
privilege not upheld); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 938 (1974).
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other discovery requests initiated in the course of litigation. 43 Twentysix states have promulgated such "shield laws" to afford some protection
to a newsperson's sources, materials, state of mind, and conduct during
the newsgathering and editorial process.4 4 These shield laws differ in
the scope of protection offered, 45 the parties entitled to invoke protec43. See Comment, The Fallacy of Farber,supra note 24, at 302.
44. Id. at 303. These shield law statutes include the following: ALA. CODE
§ 12-21-142 (Michie Supp. 1982); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150-.220 (Michie Supp.
1981); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977);
CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070 (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §4320-26
(Michie Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-119 (Smith.-Hurd Supp.
1982); IND. CODE ANN.

§34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.

§421.100 (Baldwin 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§45:1451-1454 (West Supp.
1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §9-112 (Michie Supp. 1981); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 767.5a (West Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025
(West Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-902 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144
to 147 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21,21a (West Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 38-6-7 (Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1977) N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
LAw § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 31-01-06.2 (1978);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§§ 2739.04, 2739.12 (Page

1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.

12, §2506 (West 1981); OR. REv. STAT. §§44.510-.540 (1981); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5942 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to 9-19.1-3 (Supp.
1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1980). For a chart comparing the provisions of the various state shield laws, see Comment, Fallacy of Farber,supra
note 24, at 304-09. Originally, most of these laws were drafted to create a
testimonial privilege protecting only the identity of a newsperson's sources in
criminal proceedings. Note, Case for a Federal Shield Law, supra note 24, at
161. But many of these shield laws now provide protection for information

from a source, other materials a reporter might use, and his conduct and state
of mind during the news gathering and editorial processes. Id.
Although there is no federal shield law, in 1970, the United States Attorney

General issued a set of guidelines for the Department of justice in its issuance
of subpoenas to the press. See Attorney General's Guidelines for Subpoenas
to the News Media, 7 CRIM. L REP. (BNA) 2461 (Sept. 2, 1970). These guidelines are codified at 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1981); they call for negotiations with
the media aimed at accommodating the interests of the grand jury or trial court
and of the press. See J. BARRON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND
FREE PRESS 420 n.22 (1979).
Should negotiations fail, the Attorney General's
authorization is required before a subpoena is issued. Id. See also Note,
Case for a Federal Shield Law, supra note 24, at 160.

45. Some statutes are specifically written for certain situations.

See, e.g.,

REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1978); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 9-112; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-145 to 20-147 (1977).
Others allow courts

Ky.

broad discretion to deny the privilege where the statute would otherwise appear
to provide protection. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (Michie Supp.
1978); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§45:1451 to 45:1454 (West Supp. 1982). Eleven
states currently have reporter's privilege statutes protecting only the source of
information (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania). See Comment, Journalist'sPrivilege:
In re Farber and the New Jersey Shield Law, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 545, 549 n.20
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, In re Farber]. Fifteen states protect
both undisclosed information and the source of that information (California,
Delaware, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island and
Tennessee). Id. The lack of uniformity creates uncertainty for reporters since
their work frequently crosses state lines. Id. at 549 n.22. Variations in the
language and scope of protection offered in the various shield laws, combined
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41
tion,46 and the requisite conditions for waiver of the privilege.
The newsperson's privilege in New Jersey dates from a 1933 shield
law that limited the right to compel newspersons to testify in judicial
proceedings, but this privilege protected the identity of the reporter's
source only.48 The New Jersey legislature has amended the shield law
twice in recent years in response to judicial constructions that attempted
to restrict the effect of the statute. 49 In 1972, in In re Bridge, o the

with narrow judicial construction has limited the effectiveness of these privilege
statutes. Id. at 549.
46. Compare ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (Michie Supp. 1982) and ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (1982) (protecting newspapers, radio, and television) with
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.023 (West Supp. 1982) and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A21a (West Supp. 1982) (which define "press" broadly). Shield statutes also
differ as to the types of newspersons covered. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 1070
(West Supp. 1982) (publisher, editor, reporter, radio or television reporter,
owner, official, reportorial employee of a newspaper, periodical, press association, or wire service); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4320-2 (Michie Supp. 1980)
(journalist, scholar, educator, polemicist, or other individual who spent 20 hours
engaged in preparing or obtaining news for dissemination in the three preceding weeks or in four of the eight preceding weeks); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 9-19.1-1
to 9-19.1-3 (Supp. 1981) (reporter, editor, commentator, journalist, writer, correspondent, newsphotographer, or other person engaged in the gathering of
the news).
47. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4325 (Michie Supp. 1980) (no waiver
by disclosing all or part of information protected by the privilege to any other
person); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21.3b (West Supp. 1982) (publication constitutes a waiver only as to the specific materials published).
48. Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 167, §§ 1, 2, 1933 N.J. LAws 349 (repealed
1960). The law, incorporated into the state rules of evidence, provided that
"[n]o person engaged in, connected with or employed on any newspaper shall
be compelled to disclose, in any legal proceeding . . . the source of any information procured or obtained by him and published in the newspaper on which
he is engaged, connected or employed." Id. In 1960, New Jersey's original
shield law protecting a newsperson's source was replaced by a new shield law.
Act of July 1, 1960, ch. 52, § 21, 1960 N.J. LAWS 458 (N.J. R. EvID. 27) (repealing Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 167, §§ 1, 2, 1933 N.J. LAws 349). The 1960
shield law provided that "[sjubject to Rule 37, a person engaged on, connected
with, or employed by, a newspaper has a privilege to refuse to disclose the
source, author, means, agency or person from or through whom any information
published in such newspaper was procured, obtained, supplied, furnished, or
delivered." Id. Rule 37 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence is a waiver
provision of the 1960 Act which stated
[a] person waives his right or privilege to refuse to disclose or to
prevent another from disclosing a specified matter if he or any other
person while the holder thereof has (a) contracted with anyone not to
claim the right or privilege or, (b) without coercion and with knowledge of his right or privilege, made disclosure of any part of the
privileged matter or consented to such a disclosure made by anyone.
A disclosure which is itself privileged or otherwise protected by
the common law, statutes or rules of court of this State, or by lawful
contract, shall not constitute a waiver under this section. The failure
of a witness to claim a right or privilege with respect to one question
shall not operate as a waiver with respect to any other question.
Act of July 1, 1960, ch. 52, § 29, 1960 N.J. LAws 459 (N.J. R. EvID. 37).
49. See Act of Oct. 5, 1977, ch. 253, §§ 1, 2, 1977 N.J. LAws 1027 (codified
at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21,21a (West Supp. 1982)); Act of Feb. 27, 1980,
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New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division found that a reporter's
prior disclosure of the identity of a confidential source and of some
information received from the source, constituted a waiver of the statutory "source" privilege when the reporter was called to appear before a
grand jury.5 1 Partially as a response to the Bridge decision, 52 the legislature amended the shield law in 1977 to provide for two separate
privileges: one protecting the source and one protecting any information
58
obtained by the newsperson from whatever source.
ch. 479, §§ 1-8, 1979 N.J. LAws 479 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21.1
to 21.7 (West Supp. 1982)). For a discussion of these amendments, see notes
52-60 and accompanying text infra.
50. 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (Super. Ct. A pp. Div. 1972), cert.
denied, 62 N.J. 80, 299 A.2d 78, cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 1973). Peter Bridge,
a reporter for the Newark Evening News, wrote an article concerning an alleged bribe offered to Pearl Beatty, a member of the Newark Housing Authority.
Id. at 463, 295 A.2d at 4. An Essex County grand jury proceeding began an
investigation of the alleged bribe and subpoenaed Bridge to appear before it.
Id. at 464, 299 A.2d at 4. He refused to testify, invoking his newsperson's
privilege. Id.
51. Id. at 466, 295 A.2d at 5-6. The Bridge court determined that the
reporter had waived his privilege by.disclosing this information under the then
applicable shield law waiver provision. Id. For the text of the waiver provision of the shield law in effect at the time of the Bridge decision, see note 48
supra.
52. For a discussion of the legislative history of the 1977 amendments to
the New Jersey Shield Law and the role of In re Bridge in the enactment of
the 1977 amendments, see In re Vrazo Subpoena, 176 N.J. Super. 455, 423
A.2d 695 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980). The New Jersey Supreme Court here
noted that there was no record of any committee or other legislative hearings
or reports on the 1977 amendments, but that the veto message issued on
March 2, 1973 by Governor Cahill on a predecessor Senate bill "illuminate[d]"
the privilege enacted by the 1977 Amendments. Id. at 961-62, 423 A.2d at 699.
The Court reported that the veto message said that the bill was an immediate
and compassionate reaction to an incarceration of a newspaperman-which
doubtless referred to the situation in the Bridge case .......
Id. For a discussion of the differences between the vetoed Senate bill and the adopted
version of the 1977 amendment, see note 53 and accompanying text infra.
53. Act of Oct. 5, 1977, ch. 253, § 1, 1977 N.J. LAws 1027 (N.J.R. EVID.
27) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 (West Supp. 1982)). That amendment provided as follows:
Subject to Rule 37, a person engaged on, engaged in, connected with,
or employed by news media for the purpose of gathering, procuring,
transmitting, compiling, editing, or disseminating news for the general
public or on whose behalf news is so gathered, procured, transmitted,
compiled, edited, or disseminated has a privilege to refuse to disclose,
in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before any investigative body,
including, but not limited to, any court, grand jury, petit jury, administrative agency, the Legislature, or legislative committee, or elsewhere.
a. The source, author, means, agency, or person from or through
whom any information was procured, obtained, supplied, furnished,
gathered, transmitted, compiled, edited, disseminated, or delivered; and
b. Any news or information obtained in the course of pursuing his
professional activities whether or not it is disseminated . ..
id. For the text of Rule 37, see note 58 supra. This amendment expanded
New Jersey's reporter's privilege from being purely testimonial to offering some

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 8
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 28: p. 225

54
The following year, the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Farber,
required a reporter to disclose the identity of confidential sources and
to turn over documents for use in criminal prosecutions.55 The Farber
court determined that the state constitutional right of a criminal
defendant to confront a witness in possession of favorable evidence outweighed the reporter's privilege. 56 The court, however, held that disclosure should be compelled only after compliance with certain pro57
cedural safeguards.

evidentiary protection of a newsperson's information. See In re Vrazo Subpoena,

176 N.J. Super. 455, 462, 423 A.2d 695, 699 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).

The

New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the original Senate bill which was the
predecessor to the 1977 amendments contained language that indicated that
the "proposed legislation would have limited the "information" privilege to
that obtained from the privileged source." Id. The court stated that Governor
Brendon Byrne and the legislature "were fully aware that the shield law was
being extended from a 'source' privilege to additionally an 'information' privilege
that was not limited to information obtained from a confidential source." Id.
The court added that a semicolon between the "source" privilege provision
and the "information" privilege provision makes it clear that they are independent provisions. Id. at 463, 423 A.2d at 699. The court concluded that
"[t]he legislative intent, the legislative history, the purpose and design of the
act, the spirit of the law, and the breadth of the objectives of the legislationall evidence a desire to create a broad shield for the news media." Id. at 465,
423 A.2d at 700.
54. 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). Myron
Farber, a reporter for the New York Times, worked on a series of investigative
articles reporting the criminal activities of Dr. Mario E. Jascalevich. Farber's
investigations and reporting were said to have contributed largely to the indictment and prosecution of Dr. Jascalevich for murder. Id. at 264, 394 A.2d at
332. Farber failed to comply with the two subpoenas duces tecum ordering
him to produce to the prosecuting court certain documents for the purpose of
providing evidence with which to convict Jascalevich of murder. Id. at 263-64,
394 A.2d at 332. Farber was fined and jailed for contempt of a court order
compelling discovery. Id. at 264, 394 A.2d at 332.
55. Id. at 281, 394 A.2d at 341. The Farber court, however, did recognize
the broad scope of the 1977 shield law:
We read the legislative intent in adopting this statute in its present
form as seeking to protect the confidential sources of the press as well
as information so obtained by reporters and other news media representatives to the greatest extent permitted by the Constitution of the
United States and that of the State of New Jersey.
Id. at 270, 394 A.2d at 385.
56. Id. at 274, 394 A.2d at 336. The Farber court, drawing a parallel to
the Branzburg case, ordered disclosure of Farber's confidential information
because his newsperson's privilege conflicted with a criminal defendant's right
under the New Jersey Constitution to compel the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his favor. Id. at 268-74, 394 A.2d at 334-36.
(citing N.J. CONST. art. 1 § 10).
57. Id. at 275, 394 A.2d at 337. The court urged that before disclosure
could be compelled, a hearing on the issue of relevance, materiality, and overbreadth of the subpoena, and an in camera inspection of the material subpoenaed should occur. The Farber court also stated that the three-pronged
test advocated by Justice Stewart in his Branzburg opinion should be applied
in the hearing on the motion to quash the subpoena. Id. at 276-77, 394 A.2d
at 338-39. The court determined tTat this three-pronged test was met in Farber.
Id. For a discussion of the three-pronged test, see note 41 and accompanying
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Acting on the Farber court's safeguard suggestions, the legislature
amended the shield law in 1979 to establish stringent prerequisites for
judicial enforcement of subpoenas issued to reporters on behalf of criminal defendants. 5 8 The amendments provided for in camera inspection
by the trial court of the newsperson's subpoenaed materials and a hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence according to strict
standards of relevance, necessity, and the nonavailability of the material
from a less intrusive source. 59 The 1979 criminal proceeding amendtext supra. For a discussion of the Farber opinion and the national uproar it
caused, see Comment, Fallacy of Farber, supra note 24, and Comment, In re
Farber, supra note 45.
58. Act of Feb. 27, 1980, ch. 479, §§ 1-8, 1979 N.J. LAWS 479 (codified at
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21.1-21 (West Supp. 1982)). The legislature stated
the following with respect to the purpose of the 1979 amendments:
The purpose of this bill is to provide a procedural framework for
the orderly resolution of conflicts between a newsperson claiming a
privilege not to disclose confidential information, and a criminal deendant who seeks to obtain this information in order to defend himself. The bill balances the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
trial, with the newsperson's privilege not to disclose confidential
sources. The provisions of the bill are only applicable when a criminal
defense is involved at the trial level. These procedures could not, for
example, be used by the prosecution in a criminal trial, or at a grand
jury proceeding.
Statement of the Assembly Judiciary, Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee, Assembly No. 3062 (1979).
The initial provision of the 1979 Amendments highlighted the shield law's
purpose as providing a privilege to a reporter subpoenaed in a criminal
proceeding:
Where a newsperson is required to disclose information pursuant
to a subpoena issued by or on behalf of a defendant in a criminal
proceeding, not including proceedings before administrative or investigative bodies, grand juries, or legislative committees or commissions,
the provisions and procedures in this act are applicable to the claim
and exercise of the newsperson's privilege under Rule 27 (2A:84A-21).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21.1 (West Supp. 1982).
59. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21.3 (West Supp. 1982). Those amendments
read as follows:
a. To sustain a claim of the newsperson's privilege under Rule 27
the claimant shall make a prima facie showing that he is engaged in,
connected with, or employed by a news media for the purpose of
gathering, procuring, transmitting, compiling, editing or disseminating
news for the general public or on whose behalf news is so gathered,
procured, transmitted, compiled, edited or disseminated, and that the
subpoenaed materials were obtained in the course of pursuing his
professional activities.
b. To overcome a finding by the court that the claimant has
made a prima facie showing under a. above, the party seeking enforcement of the subpoena shall show by clear and convincing evidence
that the privilege has been waived under Rule 37 (C. 2A:84A-29) or
by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the subpoenaed materials are relevant material and necessary to the defense, that they could not be secured from any less
intrusive source, that the value of the material sought as it bears upon
the issue of guilt or innocence outweighs the privilege against dis-
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ments also provided for in camera review and a hearing by the court
concerning materials for which the privilege is claimed to have been
waived.6 0 In 1980, the New Jersey Supreme Court validated these latest
shield law amendments in State v. Boiardo6 1 and interpreted

the

privilege as "intended by the legislature to be as broad as possible." 62
Against this background, the Maressa court 6 faced the issue of
whether and to what extent the New Jersey shield law protects a newsperson's sources and the editorial process from discovery in a civil
defamation suit.6 4 The court began its discussion by reviewing the
closure, and that the request is not overbroad, oppressive, or unreasonably burdensome which may be overcome by evidence that all
or part of the information sought is irrelevant, immaterial, unnecessary to the defense, or that it can be secured from another source.
Publication shall constitute a waiver only as to the specific materials
published.
c. The determinations to be made by the court pursuant to this
section shall be made only after a hearing in which the party claiming
the privilege and the party seeking enforcement of the subpoena shall
have a full opportunity to present evidence and argument with respect
to each of the materials or items sought to be subpoenaed.
Id.

60. See N.J. STAT.
provides as follows:

ANN.

2A:84A-21.4 (West Supp. 1982).

This provision

Upon a finding by the court that there has been a waiver as to

any of the materials sought or that any of the materials sought meet
the criteria set forth in subsection 3.b, the court shall order the production of such materials, and such materials only, for in camera inspection and determination as to its probable admissibility in the trial.
The party claiming the privilege and the party seeking enforcement of
the subpoena shall be entitled to a hearing in connection with the
in camera inspection of such materials by the court, during which
hearing each party shall have a full opportunity to be heard. If the
court, after its in camera review of the materials, determines that such
materials are admissible according to the standards set forth in subsection 8.b, the court shall direct production of such materials, and
such materials only.
Id.

61. 82 N.J. 446, 414 A.2d 14 (1980).

The Boiardo court upheld a re-

porter's privilege not to produce evidence for in camera inspection in response
to a subpoena by a criminal defendant because the defendant had not demonstrated a lack of less intrusive sources for obtaining the information sought as
required by the New Jersey Shield Law before initiating his request for discovery of the reporter's materials. Id. at 461, 414 A.2d at 22.
62. 82 N.J. at 457, 414 A.2d at 20. In Boiardo, the New Jersey Supreme

Court declined to decide the constitutionality of the 1979 amendments, since

the issue was not specifically raised. Id. The court stated, "[a]bsent . . .
any clear impingement on Sixth Amendment rights, the court's task is simply
to determine the legislative intent and to construe the statute accordingly."
Id. at 457, 414 A.2d at 20.
63. 89 N.J. at 181, 445 A.2d at 379. Justice Pashman, writing for the
majority, was joined by Chief Justice Wilentz and by Justices Clifford, Handler,
Pollock, and O'Hern. Justice Schreiber dissented.
64. Id. The court noted that, for the first time since New York Times v.
Sullivan, it was asked to decide "whether the Shield Law allows newspersons
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federal constitutional foundations of the newsperson's privilege. 65 The
court acknowledged that the first amendment gave newspersons only a
67
qualified privilege 66 not to reveal sources and confidential information.
Recognizing that the New Jersey legislature intended to "buttress the
constitutional protection for newsgathering" to the greatest extent,s68 the
Maressa court reviewed the recent amendments to69 and judicial constructions of the New Jersey shield law.7 0 Based on this evaluation, the
court concluded that the privilege granted to the press by the legislature
was an absolute one, giving way only to constitutionally protected
interests. 7'
The court next considered but refused to adopt Maressa's contention that this absolute privilege did not apply to "editorial processes" 72
because the legislature did not include an express reference to editorial
processes in the shield law's list of protected activities. 73 The court
who are sued for libel to refuse to disclose their sources and editorial processes
leading to publication of the alleged libel." Id.
65. Id. at 184, 445 A.2d at 380. The Maressa court noted that the United
States Supreme Court had unanimously acknowledged that a reporter's gathering of information is entitled to some first amendment protection. Id. (citing
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)). For a discussion of Branzburg, see
notes 22-30 and accompanying text supra.
66. For a discussion of a qualified privilege, see note 36 supra.
67. 89 N.J. at 185, 445 A.2d at 380-81. The majority noted that the
Branzburg Court upheld the grand jury subpoenas of newspaper reporters in
three state courts. Id. at 185, 445 A.2d at 381. The majority also asserted
that the United States Supreme Court in Herbert held that the first amendment
does not preclude inquiries into the editorial processes leading to publication
of an allegedly defamatory television program. Id. (citing Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153 (1979)). For a more detailed discussion of Herbert, see notes
31-35 and accompanying text supra.
68. Id. at 185-86, 445 A.2d at 381-82. The court stated that "[t]wice in
recent sessions, the Legislature has made evident its intent to preserve a farreaching newsperson's privilege in this State." Id. at 187, 445 A.2d at 382.
69. Id. at 185-87, 445 A.2d at 381-82. For a discussion of the recent amendments to the New Jersey shield law, see notes 49-60 and accompanying text
supra.
70. 89 N.J. at 185-87, 445 A.2d at 381-82.

The court noted that the New

Jersey Legislature amended the shield law once in response to In re Bridge,
and again in response to In re Farber. Id. at 185, 445 A.2d at 381. For a
discussion of Bridge, see notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Farber, see notes 54-57 and accompanying text supra.
71. 89 N.J. at 187, 445 A.2d at 382. The court did not define what it
meant by absolute privilege. Id. For a discussion of absolute privilege in the
context of a newsperson's privilege, see note 36 supra.
72. Id. at 188, 445 A.2d at 382. Maressa argued that the "editorial
process" included only "communications between newspersons, decisions about

which leads to pursue and what information to publish, and the development

of a newsperson's belief in the veracity of what he or she pursues and publishes." Id. For a discussion of the definition of editorial process, see note 34
supra and note 116 infra.
73. 89 N.J. at 188, 445 A.2d at 382. For the language of the relevant
provision of the shield law, see note 53 supra.
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found that the legislature intended that "all significant newsgathering
activities be protected," 74 and noted that discovery of the editorial
processes would inhibit the exchange of ideas crucial for a free press.70
On this basis, the Maressa court held that, absent any countervailing
federal or state constitutional right, the New Jersey Shield Law affords
a newsperson an absolute privilege not to disclose confidential sources
76
or editorial processes.
The Maressa court then turned to an inquiry of whether an absolute
privilege impinged upon any constitutional rights of a plaintiff in a civil
defamation action. 77 The court observed that the United States Constitution does not create a constitutional right to maintain a defamation
action 78 and that the law of defamation is essentially a state-created
74. 89 N.J. at 188, 445 A.2d at 383.

The court stated that the "litany

of protected activities was clearly intended to afford complete and pervasive
security against disclosure." Id. at 188, 445 A.2d at 383. For the list of

specific activities covered by the shield law, see note 53 supra.
75. 89 N.J. at 188-89, 445 A.2d at 383. The court quoted Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion in Herbert v. Lando:
Ideas expressed in conversations, memoranda, handwritten notes
and the like, if discoverable, would in the future "likely" lead to a
more muted, less vigorous and creative give-and-take in the editorial
room. Chief Judge Kaufman stated that "[a] reporter or editor, aware
that his thoughts might have to be justified in a court of law, would
often be discouraged and dissuaded from the creative verbal testing,
probing, and discussion of hypotheses and alternatives which are the
sine qua non of responsible journalism."
Id. at 189, 445 A.2d at 383 (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 193 (1979)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 980 (2d Cir. 1977)).
76. 89 N.J. at 189, 445 A.2d at 383. The Maressa court reasoned that
while the Supreme Court held in Herbert that the first amendment of the
federal constitution did not shield editorial processes from discovery, it did not
preclude such a privilege if created by state statute. Id. For a discussion of
Herbert, see notes 31-35 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, the majority
interpreted Branzburg as permitting state courts to construe their own constitutions to determine whether there is a constitutionally created newsperson's
privilege. 89 N.J. at 189, 445 A.2d at 383 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
706 (1972)). For a discussion of Branzburg, see notes 22-30 and accompanying
text supra. However, the Maressa court noted, "We need not determine
whether the state constitution grants an absolute evidentiary privilege to newspersons not to disclose editorial processed, for it is clear that the state courts
are equally free to enforce a privilege enacted by statute." 89 N.J. at 189,
445 A.2d at 383.
77. 89 N.J. at 190-94, 445 A.2d at 383-85. For a discussion of this portion
of the court's analysis, see notes 78-83 and accompanying text infra.
78. Id. at 190, 445 A.2d at 384 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
The majority noted that in Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, the Third Circuit,
construing a Pennsylvania shield law much like New Jersey's had observed
that
[t]he Constitution has never been construed as requiring the states
to provide persons or organizations who have been defamed with a
remedy for their injuries. It follows that, to the extent a state
chooses to authorize a cause of action for defamation, it may also
limit the plaintiff's ability to prove his claim in order to promote
other social purposes.
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remedy for injury to reputation.7 9 The state was therefore free, the
majority stated, to establish limitations on the tort of defamation, subject only to the requirement that these limitations be neither arbitrary
nor irrational.8 0 The Maressa majority next rejected the contention
that a constitutional right to maintain a libel action was created by the
New Jersey Constitution.8' Finally, the court rejected the plaintiff's
claim that denial to him of discovery of "potentially crucial" evidence
was a violation of due process.82 The court reasoned that, where nonconstitutional interests are at issue, there is no due process concern,
observing that a finding of a violation of due process would "eliminate
all statutory testimonial privileges." 83
Having concluded that the newsperson's evidentiary privilege in a
defamation action was absolute,s4 the Maressa court next considered
whether the privilege had been waived by partial disclosure.s 5 The
89 N.J. at 191, 445 A.2d at 384 (quoting Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner,
623 F.2d at 279 n.74)).
79. 89 N.J. at 190, 445 A.2d at 384. The Maressa court asserted that its
prior decisions had recognized the important societal interest in the protection
of individual reputations. Id. at 190, 445 A.2d at 383 (citing Rainer's Dairies
v. Raritan Valley Farms, Inc., 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889 (1955); Brogan v.
Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956)).
80. 89 N.J. at 190-91, 445 A.2d at 384. The court also noted that since
Paul v. Davis, the federal courts have recognized that states can modify a cause
of action for defamation by operation of testimonial privileges. Id. at 190-91,
445 A.2d at 384 (citing Mazzella v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 479 F. Supp.
523, 528 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
81. Id. at 192, 445 A.2d at 384-85. For the text of the relevant constitutional provision, see note 13 supra. The majority discerned that although
the framers of the New Jersey Constitution did not view the existence of a
libel action "as inimical to free speech it would be unwise to construe our
Constitution in a way that etches in stone any particular resolution of the
difficult conflict between the right of the media to criticize public figures and
the right of public figures to have redress of libel." 89 N.J. at 192, 445 A.2d
at 385. The court suggested that the balance of these competing interests
could be changed by the Legislature. Id. For the dissent's constitutional
interpretation, see note 99 and accompanying text infra.
82. 89 N.J. at 191, 193, 445 A.2d at 384, 385. The court stated that where
a "constitutionally protected interest" was at issue, which is not the case in a
defamation action, a plaintiff could not "be barred from proving that his
rights have been violated." Id.
83. Id. The court noted that it had sustained testimonial privileges before
at the cost of denying a party information vital to his cause of action when
such privileges served a public interest more important than the need for
full disclosure. Id. (citing State v. Briley, 53 N.J. 498, 506, 251 A.2d 442, 446
(1969)). The court said that "we need not evaluate plaintiff's interest in
compelling disclosure, other than to affirm that it does not reach constitutional
dimensions." Id. at 193, 445 A.2d at 385. The court found that "[s]ince a
plaintiff in a defamation action has no overriding constitutional interest at
stake, the newsperson's privilege is absolute in libel cases." Id. at 194, 445
A.2d at 385.
84. Id. at 193-94, 445 A.2d at 385.

85. Id. at 194-96, 445 A.2d at 385-86.

For a discussion of the disclosure

made by the defendants in Maressa, see note 9 supra.
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court held that waiver under the shield law operated only as to "those
specific materials that are knowingly and voluntarily disclosed," 81 observing that the thorough protection provided by the shield law would
be significantly diminished if it could be more easily waived. 7 The
Maressa court, therefore, concluded that the plaintiff's motion to compel
discovery must be denied.88
Recognizing that the expense of defending a libel action and the
intrusiveness of discovery can be extremely detrimental to the operation
of a free press, the court discussed the potential cost-sparing role that
summary judgment could play in defamation cases.89 The court admonished trial courts to use summary judgment procedures, whenever
possible,9 0 in order to bring meritless actions to a speedy endY1 The
86. 89 N.J. at 194, 445 A.2d at 386. The court reasoned that the 1977
amendments to the shield law tightened the requirements for waiver, since the
Legislature in 1977 created separate privileges for sources and for information
obtained in the course of pursuing professional activities. Id. The court carefully scrutinized the 1979 amendments which provided that each piece of
confidential information from a source be separately considered for the purposes of waiver and concluded that "(ilt is inconceivable that the Legislature
intended a broader view of waiver in civil matters, where the public interest
in disclosure is less compelling [than in criminal matters]." Id. at 195, 445
A.2d at 386. For a discussion of the 1977 and 1979 amendments to the shield
law, see notes 53-60 and accompanying text supra.
87. 89 N.J. at 196, 445 A.2d at 386. The court observed that "[w]here,
as here, the defendants, have steadfastly refused to divulge their sources and
the editorial processes leading to publication of the allegedly libelous article,
a finding of waiver must be rejected." Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 196, 445 A.2d at 387. The court noted that "[a]side from the
danger of a libel judgment and the instrusiveness of discovery of sources and
editorial process, the cost of defending a libel action can itself deter free
press." Id. The court asserted that "[t]he desultory pace of this three-year
litigation gives little comfort to those who would assert their constitutional
right to free speech about public affairs." Id.
90. Id. at 197 n.10, 445 A.2d at 387 n.10. The court commented that trial
courts should not hesitate to grant summary judgment in cases of privileged
expressions of opinion but noted that summary judgment would pose a more
difficult problem where the issue of actual malice was involved. Id. The court
stated that "a defendant's state of mind does not readily lend itself to summary
disposition." Id. (citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979)).
Yet the Maressa majority noted that "courts should carefully examine the circumstances surrounding publication of defamatory allegations of fact to determine whether the issue of actual malice should go to the jury." Id.
91. Id. at 196-97, 445 A.2d at 387. The court concluded that most of this
case could have been disposed of by summary judgment, since most of the
statements complained of by the plaintiff were opinions and therefore not
subject to being the basis for a defamation action. Id. at 197, 445 A.2d at 387.
The court described the appropriate role of summary judgment in this case
as follows:
It would isolate precisely what is at issue, help determine the scope of
the discovery needed by the parties and clarify for defendant what it
must prove to assert the defense of truth. All of these factors will
tend to reduce the costs incurred by defendants here, and by libel
defendants as a group, thereby diminishing the threat that libel actions
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Maressa court recognized that its construction of the shield law privilege
would prevent some libel plaintiffs from surviving a summary judgment
motion because of an inability to demonstrate "acute malice" on the
part of the defendant. 92 Nonetheless, it believed that its holding would
9
not entirely foreclose the right to maintain a cause of action. 3
Finally, the majority discussed the policy considerations supporting
an absolute newsperson's privilege. 94 The court first noted that the
legislature had determined that society's interest in a free press outweighed the interest in providing redress for damaged reputations.9 5
The majority asserted that this unsurpassed freedom was granted to the
press to ensure an informed citizenry. 96 Additionally, the majority
noted that the legislature's protection of free press, "a blessing without
pose to aggressive journalism. The media should not be forced to
engage in self-censorship for fear of the expense of defending against
frivolous challenges to its editorial judgments.
Id. at 197-98, 445 A.2d at 387 (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 198, 445 A.2d 387-88.
93. Id. The Maressa court stated that "[a]n absolute shield law privilege
gives newspersons less than absolute immunity from suit." Id. at 198, 445 A.2d
at 388.
The court concluded that a finding of actual malice could be established
by a combination of the character of the published statement and the publisher's failure to seek independent verification of the information. Id. at 199,
445 A.2d at 388. The majority explained that
an inference of actual malice may arise when a false report is published solely in reliance on confidential sources if (1) the content of
the report is such as to be defamatory as a matter of law, (2) the
defendant knew or should have known of some reasonable means of
verifying its accuracy, and (3) the failure to verify rises to the level of
a gross violation of the standards of responsible journalism.
Id. at 199-200, 445 A.2d at 388-89. The majority further asserted that a reporter's failure to verify would be provable without the necessity of discovery.
Id. at 200 n.ll, 445 A.2d at 389 n.ll. For a discussion of cases finding actual
malice on inferential, or indirect evidence, see note 33 supra.
94. Id. at 200-02, 445 A.2d at 389-90. For a discussion of public policy
rationales associated with the newsperson's privilege, see notes 108-10 and accompanying text infra.
95. 89 N.J. at 200, 445 A.2d at 389. The majority commented that, "[s]ince
defamation is a common law action without constitutional foundation, the
Legislature has the power to limit that action in favor of the right of freedom
of press." Id.
96. Id. at 200, 445 A.2d at 389. The Maressa court evaluated the public
interest in an informed citizenry as follows:
Those responsible for informing the public can discharge their function best when they can publish without anyone looking over their
shoulders. The media must meet stringent deadlines, and it is inevitable that they will occasionally publish an inaccurate statement.
The State House is no place for the meek and thin-skinned. Sometimes published statements will hurt. Sometimes they will turn out
to be untrue. Nevertheless, those regrettable consequences must yield
to the need for an informed citizenry.
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disguise," 97 fortified the "foundations of our representative democracy." 9s
Justice Schreiber dissented, contending that the New Jersey Constitution created a cause of action for defamation that could not be
eliminated by the legislature. 99 He charged that the majority opinion
"effectively eliminates a public official's or public figure's cause of action
for defamation," since malice could not be proven. 1° ° The dissent further contended that the language of the shield law did not support the
interpretation placed upon it by the majority, 101 and that the legislative
history did not reveal an intention to foreclose discovery of the editorial
process.' 02 Justice Schreiber concluded that the practical effect of the
majority's decision would be to discourage more than the merely "meek
97. Id. at 201, 445 A.2d at 389. The majority declared that "[a] government that frees the press from restraining influences is a blessing without
disguise" because "[i]t fosters the criticism of official conduct that is necessary
to make the government responsive to citizens." Id.
98. Id. The court noted that legislators have protected the press at the
cost of reducing their own protection against its attack. Id. The Maressa
court declared: "Money awards are a medium of financial recompense. But
free speech is the national currency." Id.
99. 89 N.J. at 202, 445 A.2d at 390 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). Reflecting
on the language of article 1, paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution,
Justice Schreiber stated that "[t]he sense of the words is to protect those who
would be defamed by irresponsible utterances." Id. at 208, 445 A.2d at 393
(Schreiber, J., dissenting). Justice Schreiber stated that the legislature was
without power to abolish a constitutionally created cause of action for defamation. Id. The dissent further criticized the majority's interpretation of the
shield law as eliminating this constitutionally created cause of action for defamation stating that "the language and sense of that [shield] law do not justify
that interpretation." Id. at 203, 445 A.2d at 390 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). In
concluding that the New Jersey Constitution created a right to bring a defamation action, Justice Schreiber examined the historical context in which the
relevant provision of the constitution was enacted. See id. at 206-08, 445 A.2d
at 392-93 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). For the majority's response to this argument, see notes 78-81 and accompanying text supra. For the text of the relevant
constitutional provision, see note 13 supra. Justice Schreiber also analyzed
relevant libel decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and observed
that the Herbert court had concluded that foreclosing discovery of editorial
processes would be going too far at the expense of the individual who had been
injured by the defamatory statement. 89 N.J. at 204-05, 445 A.2d at 391
(Schreiber, J., dissenting).
100. 89 N.J. at 209-10, 445 A.2d at 393 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). Justice
Schreiber disagreed with the majority's assertion that a plaintiff would be able
to prove recklessness by showing that the publisher failed to seek independent
verification. Id.
101. Id. at 210, 445 A.2d at 394 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). Justice Schreiber
indicated that a close reading of the statute revealed no reference to "the defendant newspaper person's editorial processes" and that the law "does not
refer to his impressions of the facts gathered, his conclusions of their veracity,
or his intentions as manifested by his editorial decisions." Id.
102. Id. at 210-11, 445 A.2d at 394 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). Justice
Schreiber asserted "I do not believe the legislature intended to adopt the
'stunning' proposition that the defendant has an absolute privilege to resist
the most direct form of inquiry into the precise matter the plaintiff is required
to prove with 'convincing clarity.'" Id. (citation omitted).
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and thin-skinned" 103 from seeking public office. 104
In analyzing the Maressa court's opinion, it is submitted that it was
legitimate for the New Jersey Supreme Court to recognize the existence
of an absolute newsperson's privilege under state law,105 despite the fact
that the United States Supreme Court has not recognized such a constitutional privilege. 06 The Maressa court was also bound by its own
precedent and the language and legislative history of the shield law to
interpret this privilege to be "as broad as possible." 107
It is submitted, however, that on policy grounds, an absolute newsperson's privilege is unworkable. The imposition of an absolute privilege
would, as both the majority and dissent in Maressa acknowledge, further
burden public figure plaintiffs who must already comply with the
stringent New York Times actual malice standard, and would, it is submitted, virtually preclude them from bringing defamation actions against
the press.' 08 A qualified privilege, on the other hand, would adequately
protect the press while also serving society's expressed desire to shelter
the press from the harassment of costly litigation 109 and the suppression
of the newsgathering and editorial processes. 110
A careful examination of precedent reveals a consensus that whenever testimonial or evidentiary privileges have been granted by constitu103. Id. at 211, 445 A.2d at 394 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
104. Id. Justice Schreiber countered the majority by observing that
it is more than the meek and thin-skinned who may refuse public
office rather than expose themselves to possible public contempt and
ridicule by an irresponsible reporter. Apparently persons within
these categories should henceforth disqualify themselves from accepting
any public office. Evermore devastating is the fact that the Maressa
doctrine will be applied to ordinary citizens attempting to voice their
views in town meetings.
Id. (citing Lawrence v. Bauer, 89 N.J. 451, 446 A.2d 469 (1982)) (Schreiber,
J., dissenting).
105. For a discussion of the 1977 amendments to the New Jersey Shield
Law which provided for a general newsperson's privilege, see note 53 supra.
106. See notes 22-35 & 65-67 and accompanying text supra.
107. For a discussion of the legislative history of the 1977 amendments to
the Shield Law, see notes 52-53 supra. For a discussion of the Boiardo decision
in which the New Jersey Supreme Court first interpreted the 1979 amendments to the shield law, see notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
108. It is submitted that the dissent is correct on this point. For a discussion of Justice Schreiber's view on this burden of proof, see notes 99-100
and accompanying text supra. See also notes 115 & 117 and accompanying
text infra.

109. For a discussion of the Maressa court's analysis of the chilling effect
of meritless defamation actions brought against the press to "harass" newspersons, see note 89 and accompanying text supra. See also Blasi, supra note
38, at 261-62 (discussion of "harassing" press subpoenas forcing newspersons
to testify to cumulative evidence that is already a matter of record); Franklin,
supra note 30, at 1049 (discussion of development of "First Amendment insurance Program" to provide low-cost legal aid to small newspapers); Comment,
Suing Media, supra note 28, at 797 n.1, 800 nn.12-13 (discussion of litigation
costs involved in media v. public figure plaintiff defamation suits).
110. See notes 28 & 75 supra.
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tional interpretations "' or by state shield laws, 112 these privileges have
been qualified ones.113 It is submitted that the Maressa majority's activist stance toward press freedoms 114 precluded it from carefully weighing the effect of an absolute newsperson's privilege on the already
burdensome discovery process in defamation suits involving public
figures."15 It is at least arguable that the New Jersey Legislature never
intended the statutory newsperson's privilege to be as absolute as the
Maressa court found it to be, and in fact shortly after the Maressa
opinion was decided, amendments were proposed in the State Senate to
restrict the effect of its holding. 116
111. For a discussion of the various federal courts' interpretations of the
federal constitutional protection afforded newspersons from discovery in civil
defamation suits, see notes 19-42 and accompanying text supra.
112. For a discussion of various state shield laws creating qualified reporter's privileges, see notes 43-47 and accompanying text supra.
113. See notes 111 & 112 supra.
114. For examples of language in the majority opinion evidencing judicial
advocacy on behalf of media defendants, see notes 96-98 supra. Justice Pashman of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the writer of the majority opinion in
Maressa, in a speech to the New Jersey Press Association, rejected the
"qualified" privilege urged by most of the present United States Supreme
Court by stating "Lt]here can be no doubt that the press freedom guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution which marked the Warren Court has exhausted
itself." See Address by Justice Pashman, note 23 supra, at 534. Justice Pashman also remarked:
Regardless of what the federal courts do in the name of the First
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the state courts of New
Jersey-and especially the New Jersey Supreme Court-have an independent responsibility to construe and enforce the State Constitution.
We have only recently begun to reassume this responsibility ...
In the area of freedom of the press, we have not yet aroused ourselves
to this responsibility, but surely the recent Burger Court will require
us to do so.
Id.
115. See 89 N.J. at 198, 445 A.2d at 387-88. The Maressa majority downplayed the risk of abuse from this absolute privilege: "It would be unfortunate
if some newspersons fabricate malicious lies and then claimed immunity from
liability by claiming that they relied in good faith on a confidential source
whose identity they decline to reveal." Id. (emphasis supplied).
116. A bill was introduced into the Judiciary Committee of the New
Jersey Senate by Senator Russo on June 10, 1982 to amend the New Jersey
shield law to provide, inter alia, for a definition of "editorial process." See
S. 1519, 200th Legis., 1st Sess. (1982). See note 53 for the version of the shield
law without a definition of "editorial process." This bill also provides that
a person engaged on, engaged in, connected with, or otherwise employed in gathering . . . editing . . . or disseminating news for the
public . . . against whom a civil action for defamation is instituted,
shall not have a privilege to refuse to disclose the editorial process
which formed the basis of the news product alleged to be defamatory,
where an inquiry into this editorial process may produce evidence
material to the proof of a critical element of the plaintiff's cause
of action
Id. The statement accompanying the bill cites Herbert as authority for the
proposition that no such privilege under the first amendment for editorial
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It is suggested that the impact of the Maressa decision will be most
acutely felt by public figure plaintiffs who will find themselves up
against the formidable defense of absolute privilege, often at the earliest
stages of the litigation. 117 Hopefully, the Maressa opinion will provide
impetus for further amendment to the New Jersey shield law, 118 and
perhaps to the twenty-six other states' shield laws in the United States. 119
It seems desirable for a statutory amendment that would implement a
qualified newsperson's privilege which provides for in camera review
and a preliminary hearing to test the admissibility of subpoenaed evidence. 120 These procedural safeguards, which are already in use in the
New Jersey Shield law privilege for newspersons in criminal trials,121
would give the trial court the flexibility to scrutinize discovery requests
under the standards of relevancy and necessity 122 and to dispose of
128
frivolous actions through summary judgment.
Until the New Jersey Legislature speaks, it is possible that courts
will extend this absolute reporter's privilege into other areas of substantive law under which a newsperson is subject to discovery regarding
his sources or other background information. The danger of conferring
processes in a defamation action. Id. Currently, the bill is in the New Jersey
Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Id.
117. See Comment, Suing the Media, note 28 supra, at 830.

This com-

mentator suggested that state law defenses, such as statutory reporter's privileges are used most often at the motion to dismiss stage and are more attractive
to media defendants than first amendment defenses which tend to operate at
the summary judgment stage at the earliest. Id.
118. See note 116 supra.

119. For a discussion of nationwide shield laws, see notes 43-47 supra.

See also Note, Infidelity to New York Times, supra note 31, at 396-97.

This

author recommended the state-by-state enactment of laws specifically shielding
the press in defamation cases. Id. at 396. She noted that state privilege
statutes would also trigger protection in the federal diversity arena in cases
involving questions of state law under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. Id. at 397.
120. For a discussion of another proposed qualified privilege which uses
these procedural safeguards, see Justice Brennan's dissent in Herbert in note 36
supra. For a discussion of the 1979 amendments to the New Jersey Shield
Law which use these safeguards in a criminal defendant context, see notes 58-60
and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Justice Stewart's proposal,
see notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
121. See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
122. For Justice Stewart's use of these standards to limit discovery, see
notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra. See also the 1979 New Jersey Shield
Law amendments' use of these standards in note 59 and accompanying text
supra.

123. For the Maressa court's discussion of the appropriate use of summary
judgment to limit frivolous "public figure" defamation suits, see notes 90-91
and accompanying text supra.
It is notable that Justice Powell's concurrence in Herbert discussed the
possible increased use of the summary judgment motion with a balancing of
interests to allow for a qualified reporter's privilege at the trial court level.
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. at 179-80 (Powell, J., concurring). For a discussion
of his approach, see note 36 supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1982

27

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 8

252

[VOL. 28: p. 225

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEw

such immunity on the press is that it erects an "impenetrable shield"
around the news media without accommodating the concomitant re124
sponsibility of a free press in a democratic society.

Frances A. McElhill
124. See Lewis, supra note 32, at 91-92. This commentator, a newsreporter, rejects the proposition that the press deserves an absolute privilege
because of its preferred position in American society as "watch dogs of
democracy":
The press is not a separate estate in the American system. Its
great function is to act for the public in keeping government accountable to the public. And it would be a poor bargain, for the press
and the country, if a special status for journalism were accompanied
by greater latitude for government to avoid accountability by closing
its proceedings.
Justice Stewart's idea of a preferred constitutional position for
the organized press was inevitably appealing to journalists, but it
would hurt their real interests if it became accepted doctrine. It
would separate the professional press from the public it represents,
and increase the risk of arrogance.
Id. at 91. See also Blasi, supra note 38, at 282. This commentator reveals
that a majority of newspersons polled in a particular survey responded that a
particular qualified privilege was adequate to protect them in their relationships
with sources rather than noting that a stronger privilege was necessary. Id.
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